Applied Epistemology Bibliography

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It is impossible to be fully comprehensive, and there are surely some gaps in the coverage of this list. We aim to update it periodically; if you have suggestions for inclusion, please let us know [here](#).

Additionally, please note that many pieces cross more than one topic and consequently could have been listed under a different topic area.

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I.   Trust, Testimony, and Deference

A. Trust in General

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D. Testimony, Deference, and Social (In)justice

i) Testimonial Injustice and the Epistemic Marginalization of the Oppressed[1]

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[1] Note: The literature on epistemic (in)justice is vast, and we have now tried to cover it comprehensively here. Rather, we have focused on some core pieces that make particular contact with the issues related to testimony, trust and deference discussed in the previous subsections.

[2] Note: Similar to the above, the literature on standpoint epistemology is extensive, and we do not aim to survey it in its entirety here. Rather, we have focused on recent pieces that concern in particular the relationship between standpoint epistemology and practices of deference to oppressed individuals/groups.

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II.   The Epistemology of Information and the Media

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